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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper reviews the cognitive, affective and attentional factors that contribute to 
individual perseverative worry bouts. We describe how automatic biases in attentional 
and interpretational processes contribute to threat detection and to the inclusion of 
negative intrusive thoughts into the worry stream typical of the ಯwhat if …?ರ thinking 
style of pathological worriers. The review also describes processes occurring 
downstream from these perceptual biases that also facilitate perseveration, including 
cognitive biases in beliefs about the nature of the worry process, the automatic 
deployment of strict goal-directed responses for dealing with the threat, the role of 
negative mood in facilitating effortful forms of information processing (i.e. systematic 
information processing styles), and in providing negative information for evaluating 
the success of the worry bout. We also consider the clinical implications of this model 
for an integrated intervention programme for pathological worrying.  
 
Key terms: worry; anxiety; attentional biases; interpretational biases; goal-directed 
rules; negative mood; systematic information processing 
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Introduction 
 
Worry is an activity that most people experience on a regular basis. But for 
some people this activity can become pathological, uncontrollable and distressing, 
and lead to regular bouts of seemingly uncontrollable, anxious worry that negatively 
affects social, occupational, and familial functioning. When excessive and 
uncontrollable worry of this kind occurs, it is the defining feature of Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As well 
as being the cardinal diagnostic feature of GAD, pathological worry1 is also an 
important transdiagnostic process, which contributes to a number of other 
psychopathologies (Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Ehring & Watson, 2008). These 
include panic disorder (Casey, Oei, & Newcombe, 2004), social phobia (Clark & 
Wells; Mellings & Alden, 1995), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Comer, Kendall, 
Franklin, Hudson, & Pimentel, 2004), and depression (Diefenbach et al., 2001; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Individuals who exhibit high levels of worry (either with GAD, 
with sub-threshold GAD, or without a GAD diagnosis) also report poorer perceived 
physical health, greater levels of stress, and increased sleep difficulties (Kertz & 
Woodruff-Borden, 2011). 
Pathological worry is defined by Barlow (2002) as excessive anxious 
apprehension relating to future negative or threatening events, and this type of worry 
is considered to be negatively valenced, distressing to the worrier (Borkovec, 
Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983; Davey, Eldridge, Drost & MacDonald, 2007), 
                                                          
1
 When used throughout this paper, the term ಫpathological worryಬ refers to worrying 
that is excessive, relatively uncontrollable and distressing for the individual, and as 
such is transdiagnostic in nature. 
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and predominately verbal (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998). Pathological worriers 
view their worries as being uncontrollable whereas infrequent worriers do not (Davey, 
Tallis, Capuzzo, 1994), and one way in which uncontrollable worry manifests is in the 
process of catastrophising (Brietholtz, Westling & Ost, 1998; Davey & Levy, 1998; 
Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), where individuals appear to apply a perseverative “what 
if?” questioning style to perceived problems. Key differences in duration and intensity 
of worry are also reported in high compared to low worriers. High worriers will 
continue with a worry episode for significantly longer and experience greater 
emotional discomfort than non-worriers (Startup & Davey, 2001; Vasey & Borkovec 
1992). 
While pathological worry is closely associated with anxiety and is a prominent 
feature of almost all of the anxiety disorders (Brown, Antony & Barlow, 1992), it is 
an activity that is distinct from anxiety and not simply the cognitive component of 
anxiety. For example, Davey Hampton, Farrell, and Davidson (1992) found that 
worry and anxiety can be understood as two separate constructs, each with their own 
unique sources of variance. They reported that worry was associated with adaptive 
problem focused coping strategies and an information seeking cognitive style, 
whereas trait anxiety was associated with poor problem solving confidence, poor 
perceived personal control, responsibility for negative but not positive outcomes, the 
tendency to perceive events as threats, and avoidant or emotion focused coping 
strategies. Thus, while worry is an attempt to address problems or find solutions 
suitable for dealing with future threats, this problem-solving process can often be 
thwarted by factors associated with high levels of anxiety (Davey, 1994), and this can 
result in perseveration of a worry bout and increases in self-reported distress during a 
worry bout (Davey, Eldridge, Drost & MacDonald, 2007; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), 
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both of which contribute to turning adaptive worrying into pathological worrying. 
Most contemporary models of pathological worrying attempt to explain this 
psychopathology by alluding to pathological worrying as a dispositional characteristic 
found across a range of anxiety disorders and postulate explanations at the global 
level in terms of how worrying has become an endemic characteristic of an anxious 
individual (e.g. Wells, 2007, 2012; Ladoucer, Talbot & Dugas, 1997; Birrell, Meares, 
Wilkinson & Freeston, 2011; Pratt, Tallis & Eysenck, 1997). However, proximal 
models of individual pathological worry bouts are much rarer (but see Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012), but will be required to understand the individual psychological 
mechanisms which generate a worry experience that is perseverative, seemingly 
uncontrollable, and increasingly distressing as the bout continues. 
This purpose of this paper is to review some of the cognitive, affective and 
attentional factors that contribute to the perseverative worry bout. At the proximal 
level we need to understand what triggers an individual worry bout, and what 
cognitive mechanisms cause the individual to perseverate that worry bout. We have 
focused on worry bout perseveration because it is one feature that operationalizes the 
inability to control the worry bout, and it is a characteristic of catastrophic worry 
where increasing levels of distress are caused by systematic inflation of the 
aversiveness of the worry as the bout progresses (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992) As such, 
perseveration embodies many of the critical characteristics that define worry as 
pathological. Processes involved in generating a perseverative bout include the role of 
cognitive biases in identifying threats, biases in beliefs about the nature of the worry 
process, biases in the deployment of goal-directed rules for worrying, and finally, 
biases in the way that experienced mood can influence the nature of the processing 
6 
undertaken during a worry bout. The following sections in turn describe (1) the role of 
cognitive biases in identifying worries, (2) the determinants of perseveration during a 
worry bout, and finally (3) a description of how these processes may interact to 
generate worry perseveration. Because of the transdiagnostic nature of pathological 
worry and the involvement of basic psychological processes in perseverative worry, 
the evidence described in these sections comes from a combination of studies 
conducted on both clinical populations and experimental psychopathology studies 
conducted on healthy participants. 
 
The Role of Cognitive Biases in Identifying Worries 
We are exposed to a barrage of information in daily life and we make either 
implicit or explicit decisions about how that information is processed. People who 
experience high levels of anxiety (both those with GAD and high worriers) are known 
to have a number of biases in the way they process information which means that they 
have greater exposure to, or are more aware of, threat relevant information in the 
environment (Mathews & McLeod, 1994). These cognitive biases are thought both to 
cause and maintain pathological worry (Hayes & Hirsch, 2007; Hirsch & Mathews, 
2012, Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).  This section will examine cognitive biases in 
attention, interpretation, and memory and consider evidence for their role in 
pathological worry.  
Attentional Biases: Attending to potentially threatening information quickly and 
efficiently is an adaptive process. If the potential threat is assessed as being 
problematic it can then be dealt with and if the concern was a false alarm, one can 
step down from psychological and physiological threat readiness.  However, 
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individuals who are vulnerable to anxiety have a threat orientated ‘vigilant’ 
processing mode where attention is easily captured by potential, often minor, threat 
cues (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). 
Attentional biases contribute to excessive and pathological worry by 
enhancing the worrier’s ability to detect and selectively attend to threat cues 
(Mathews, 1990). Individuals who experience excessive and uncontrollable anxiety 
have been shown to attend to threat-relevant information at the expense of benign or 
positive information and this has been associated with the onset and maintenance of 
experienced anxiety and with the development of anxiety disorders (Mathews, 1990; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). However, while biases in 
attention toward threat-relevant information have been associated with anxiety, what 
evidence is there that these information-processing biases relate to worry per se? 
Research has examined attentional biases in individuals with GAD. Mathews, 
Mogg, Kentish, and Eysenk (1995) found that compared to a non-anxious control 
group, individuals with GAD were slower on a Stroop task to name colours when the 
word was threat-relevant and slower when searching for a target within threatening 
distractors. This indicates that GAD participants (who experience excessive and 
uncontrollable worry as a core symptom of their diagnosis) exhibit greater attentional 
bias for threat as compared to non-anxious controls. However, a limitation of this type 
of study is that worry and trait anxiety cannot be teased apart and thus it is unclear 
whether the attentional bias is associated with worry, or trait anxiety, or both. There is 
however robust evidence to support the view that biases in attention to threat are not 
only correlated with pathological worry, but are also a significant causal factor in 
generating worry (Hayes & Hirsch, 2007; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). This is 
evidenced by studies that have attempted to ameliorate the threat attention biases in 
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pathological worriers using cognitive bias modification techniques (e.g. Hayes, 
Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010). In one study, Hayes et 
al. (2010) asked high worriers to complete two attention training tasks (a benign vs. 
worry words task and a dichotomous listening task) where 50% of the high worry 
group had their attention trained towards benign information while ignoring worrying 
information and the other half the group had their attention directed to equal amounts 
of both benign and worry related information. The dependent variable was a worry 
task where participants were asked to engage in a breathing task, during which 
numbers of intrusive thoughts were monitored. Hayes et al. found that the group who 
had their attention trained towards benign material had significantly fewer worry-
relevant negative thought intrusions as compared to the control group, although the 
groups did not differ on the type of worry topics or how negative the topics were. This 
finding suggests that attentional biases contribute to the frequency of negative thought 
intrusions that are common in worry thought content, but not the severity of the 
thought intrusions. Interestingly, there was no effect of attention training on anxious 
mood, indicating that training affected intrusive thoughts relevant to worry, but not 
self-reported anxiety. Hirsch et al. (2011) also demonstrated that training non-anxious 
participants to have increased biased attentional engagement with threat, subsequently 
increased worry symptoms (negative thought intrusions) as compared to those who 
had been trained to disengage from threat.  One indirect implication of this is that 
increased attentional engagement with threat causally affects worry symptoms (Hirsch 
et al., 2011).  
The research cited above suggests that individuals who experience 
pathological worry exhibit attentional biases to threatening information. The tendency 
to attend to threatening material at the expense of benign information will heighten 
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the perception that the world in a threatening place, which is likely to trigger 
processes that will initiate worry. Once threat representations are activated, attentional 
biases are thought to contribute to maintenance of worry episodes by promoting 
attention towards threatening thought intrusions, thus escalating threat perception and 
maintaining the worry cycle (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). 
Interpretation Biases: Daily life is full of ambiguity and research suggests that 
people who experience high levels of anxiety are more likely to interpret emotionally 
ambiguous situations in a threatening rather than non-threatening manner (e.g. Butler 
& Mathews, 1983; Eysenk, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; Eysenk, Mogg, May, 
Richards, & Mathews, 1991, Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). This tendency to 
interpret ambiguity in favour of threating interpretations is another example of an 
information processing bias that is thought to exert both a causal and maintaining 
effect on pathological worry. For example, individuals with a diagnosis of GAD are 
more likely to interpret emotionally ambiguous information in a threat-congruent 
manner compared to non-anxious controls (e.g. Mathews, Richards, & Eysenk, 1989). 
Experimental studies with high worriers have enabled researchers to conclude that 
there is a causal relationship between interpretation biases and worry. For example, 
Hirsch, Hayes, and Mathews (2009) examined the effect of manipulating 
interpretation biases in high worriers. They employed two tasks, a homograph task 
and an ambiguous scenarios task. Half the participants were assigned to a benign 
training condition, which meant that they were exposed to only benign interpretations 
of the ambiguous scenarios and the control group were exposed to equal numbers of 
benign and threat interpretations of the ambiguous information. The dependent 
variable was the number of negative thought intrusions in a breathing focus period 
that took place both before and after an instructed worry period. There was a 
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significant difference between the two groups, suggesting that the manipulation of 
interpretation towards benign outcomes (as opposed to training which did not favour 
either benign or negative outcomes) had an ameliorative effect on thought intrusions. 
However, Hirsch et al. (2009) reported that there was no difference between the two 
groups in the type of negative thought intrusion, or how negative the topics were. 
These findings were also replicated in participants with a diagnosis of GAD (Hayes et 
al., 2010) and provide evidence that threat-relevant interpretation biases can play a 
direct causal role in generating negative intrusions implicated in the onset of worry 
(Hayes & Hirsch, 2007; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012).  
Research cited above indicates that interpretation biases are likely to trigger 
worry by creating negative interpretations of ambiguous information and this (as was 
also found in studies of attentional biases) has been found to increase the frequency of 
negative thought intrusions, but not the type or severity of the thought intrusion. This 
is in keeping with a dimensional view of psychopathology where pathological worry 
is thought to be quantitatively rather than qualitatively different to normal functioning 
(Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001). Research outlined above suggests that in 
pathological worry, habitually experiencing negative responses to emotionally 
ambiguous information will increase threat perception, subsequently triggering worry 
processes (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Mathews, 1990). However, this type of 
interpretation bias does not necessarily exist in isolation from attentional biases and a 
combined cognitive bias approach (Hirsch, Clark & Mathews, 2006; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012) assumes that information processing biases interact with one another. 
Hayes & Hirsch (2007) outline a scenario whereby attention could be captured by a 
cue in the environment, which may be hard to then disengage from. Once threat 
representations are activated through attentional biases, this may make the individual 
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more likely to interpret emotionally ambiguous information in a threatening manner 
which in turn increases threat perception and so the cycle may continue resulting in a 
full-blown worry episode. This approach to understanding the nature of cognitive 
biases in worry has been supported in research by White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & 
Fox (2011) who found that training individuals to have biased attention toward threat 
was linked to subsequent negative interpretation of ambiguity. 
 
Memory Biases:  A third information processing bias that has been examined as 
a potential contributor to pathological worry is memory biases. One hypothesis is that 
pathological worry is facilitated by a processing bias in favour of the recall of threat-
relevant information. This selective memory for threatening information could serve 
to heighten threat perception, which in turn feeds processing that may facilitate worry.  
However, there is currently little evidence to support this view. For example, Coles 
and Heimberg (2002) in a review of memory biases in clinically anxious populations 
(e.g. where worry is a cardinal diagnostic feature) point out that only one out of nine 
studies found any support for the role of an explicit  (e.g. effortful and conscious 
retrieval of information) memory bias in a GAD population. The study by Mogg and 
Mathews (1990) reported that in an explicit memory task the GAD patients recalled 
more anxiety words than non-anxious controls. However, they predicted that a recall 
bias in GAD participants would only be evident in anxious words that were also self-
referent but this prediction was not upheld.  Mogg, Mathews, and Weinman (1987) 
compared clinically anxious patients with non-anxious controls on recall of positive, 
negative, threatening, and non-threatening words, and found no evidence to support 
the view of biased recall in an anxious population. Interestingly, their results actually 
indicated that high anxious individuals had poorer memory for threat words as 
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compared to a control condition, and other studies have also consistently found no 
evidence to support the role of explicit memory biases in pathological worry (e.g., 
Foa, McNally & Murdock, 1989; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985, Mogg et al., 1989).  
Implicit memory biases (enhanced recall related to prior exposure to a stimulus, 
without awareness of that prior exposure) have also been implicated in pathological 
worry. In one study Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenk (1989) reported that, after an 
implicit memory task, individuals with a diagnosis of GAD generated more threat-
relevant completions on a word completion task as compared to a non-clinical control 
group. Further association between this type of memory bias and GAD was found by 
MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995). However, as highlighted by Coles and Heimberg 
(2002), two other studies (Bradely et al., 1995; Mathews et al., 1995) did not replicate 
these results. More recently, Coles, Turk & Heimberg (2007) proposed that previous 
studies may have failed to find support for implicit and explicit memory biases in 
GAD as anxious stimuli used in experimental tasks may not have had equal relevance 
for all participants. Coles et al. (2007) suggested that if the stimuli do not have 
relevance for each individualಬs specific domain of worry, then it is unlikely that there 
will be evidence of a memory bias. This hypothesis was confirmed by assessing 
implicit and explicit memory bias in GAD patients where the GAD group individually 
selected words that were personally relevant to their domain of worry. Using 
idiographic stimuli, compared to non-anxious controls, the GAD group showed 
evidence of an implicit memory bias. Furthermore there was some evidence (a trend 
that did not reach statistical significance) to suggest the GAD group also showed an 
explicit memory bias, but Coles et al. (2007) highlight that this finding would need to 
be clarified by a study with greater power to detect group differences. The evidence 
for the role of implicit memory biases in GAD is thus currently contradictory. 
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However, studies that employ idiographic stimuli may provide a more 
methodologically appropriate way of examining memory biases in worry. Presently, 
therefore, there is little conclusive evidence that involves memory biases in the 
processes that lead to pathological worrying, and so we do not include memory biases 
in the building blocks of the model we describe below. However, this situation may 
change with further research that directly explores the role of implicit memory 
processes in the development and maintenance of pathological worrying.  
  
Summary: There is evidence to suggest that both attention and interpretation 
biases are associated with, and play a causal role in, pathological worry. However, 
there is little evidence thus far suggesting that memory biases contribute directly to 
pathological worry. Attention and interpretation biases appear to facilitate the 
frequency of negatively-valenced thought intrusions which will either trigger 
worrying or provide suitable subject matter for the worrier’s “what if…?” questioning 
style. 
Attentional control and worry  
Information processing biases are considered to be automatic ಫbottom-upಬ 
processes (e.g. Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) and (as discussed above) attention and 
interpretation biases increase the frequency of intrusive worry thoughts. Deciding 
when to attend to (or distract ourselves from) these types of threat relevant 
information is an effortful top-down process that requires attentional control. 
Attentional control is a key function of the central executive component of working 
memory (Derakshan & Eysenk, 2009; MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Rapee, 1993). 
Attentional control theory assumes that worry impairs cognitive performance by 
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consuming limited attentional resources in working memory, meaning that less 
working memory capacity is available for concurrent tasks (Eysenk & Calvos, 1992; 
Eysenk, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Individuals with GAD are known to 
have depleted attentional control (Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam & Coker, 
2014) and one implication of this is that they are less able to exert attention control 
over worry thoughts to stop worrying (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008). These 
research findings help to explain why high anxious individuals find it more difficult to 
control and dismiss worry thoughts. 
 
Determinants of Perseveration During a Worry Bout 
 
At the proximal level we need to understand not only what triggers an individual 
worry bout, but also what cognitive mechanisms cause the individual to perseverate 
that worry bout. In this section we will discuss some of the processes that contribute 
to the perseveration of a worry bout and which begin to define a mechanism of 
pathological worry at the proximal level. These processes include cognitive biases in 
beliefs about the nature of the worry process, biases in the deployment of goal-
directed rules for worrying, and biases in the way that experienced mood can 
influence the nature of the processing undertaken during a worry bout as well as 
provide information by which goal-directed rules contribute to perseveration. 
 
Perseverative or Iterative Styles: Early accounts of perseverative worrying 
hypothesized that worriers had biases towards perseverative or iterative styles of 
thought (e.g. Kendall & Ingram, 1987; Davey & Levy, 1998; Vasey & Borkovec, 
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1992). Various thinking styles were believed to contribute to perseveration, including 
the worrier persistently posing internal automatic questions of the “what if…?” kind 
(e.g. Kendall & Ingram, 1987) that would inevitably lead to the catastrophizing of 
individual worries. Using a procedure based on the cognitive techniques of de-
catastrophizing, Vasey & Borkovec (1992) found that chronic worriers generated 
significantly more catastrophizing steps in a catastrophizing interview2 than 
nonworriers, and reported a significant increase in discomfort and distress as the 
catastrophizing process progressed. This also led to worriers rating the events in each 
step of the catastrophizing process as more likely to occur than did nonworriers, 
suggesting the possibility of an expectancy bias for threatening or negative outcomes 
to occur – a bias that is found in a number of other forms of psychopathology (Davey, 
1992) and can be driven by prior levels of fear or anxiety (Diamond, Matchett & 
Davey, 1995). This catastrophic perseveration in worriers has been observed in a 
variety of procedures (Davey, 2006a) using both real worries and hypothetical worries 
that the worrier would not have considered before (Davey & Levy, 1998) – the latter 
suggesting that this style is one that is not simply based on the previous elaboration of 
already experienced worries, but can be readily applied to novel worries by the 
worrier. 
 One initial explanation of this catastrophizing style of worriers was that it may 
be generated by mood congruency effects (Bower, 1981). There is clear evidence that 
pathological worriers experience significantly increased levels of negative mood 
                                                          
2
 The catastrophising interview procedure begins with the question “What is it about 
__________ that worries you?” where the blank is the participant’s main current worry. 
The participant’s response is then followed by the question “What about ________ 
would you find fearful or bad if it did actually happen?” where the blank is filled by the 
participants response to the previous question. This process continues until the 
participant can think of no more answers, and the number of steps emitted is used as a 
measure of perseveration (Davey, 2006a) 
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compared with nonworriers (e.g. Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990; Davey, 
Hampton, Farrell & Davidson, 1992), and also experience increased distress and 
negative mood as a worry bout progresses (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992; Davey, 
Eldridge, Drost & MacDonald, 2007), and this negative mood may facilitate the 
access and retrieval of congruent negative information in memory which feeds the 
iterative “what if …?” questioning style. The fact that negative mood can contribute 
causally to worry perseveration has been shown in experimental studies that have 
manipulated mood valency and found that negative mood facilitates worry 
perseveration relative to positive and neutral mood manipulations (Johnston & Davey, 
1997; Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003). 
 However, what makes mood congruency difficult to sustain as a principal 
cognitive bias underpinning perseverative worry is that worriers will also perseverate 
more in a positive iterative task than nonworriers. Davey & Levy (1998, Study 4) 
found that chronic worriers would also perseverate for longer than nonworriers at a 
positive iteration task – even though they reported being in a significantly more 
negative mood than nonworriers. In a subsequent study, Startup & Davey (2001, 
Experiment 1) induced negative, positive and neutral moods in three groups of 
healthy, nonclinical participants. Contrary to predictions from a mood congruency 
explanation, participants in a negative mood emitted significantly more steps in both a 
positive and negative iteration task (where they were respectively asked to iterate 
what was either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ about a situation) than participants in either a positive 
or a neutral mood. These findings are not easy to incorporate within a mood 
congruency explanation of worry perseveration claiming that perseveration should be 
facilitated only when there is a congruency between the valency of the material being 
iterated and the mood in which this task is being conducted. 
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Biases in the Deployment of Goal-Directed Rules for Worrying:   
For most people, worrying has a purpose, whether it be to solve perceived problems 
of daily living (Davey, 1994), as an attempt to repair negative mood (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983), or as a means to try and ensure that ‘bad’ things don’t happen or to 
avoid future catastrophes (Breitholtz, Westling & Ost, 1998; Davey, Tallis & 
Capuzzo, 1996; Wells, 2010; Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens & Diaz, 1999). Activities 
that have such a purpose usually come with a set of goal-directed rules that are 
deployed to maximize goal attainment and to evaluate when the goal has been reached 
(Martin, Ward, Achee & Wyer, 1993; Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989). Goal-
directed rules require attention to the goal of the worry task and a desire to continue 
with the task until the strict aims of the task have been achieved. When such rules are 
articulated by worriers, they include statements such as ಯI feel I must focus on every 
conceivable solution to this worryರ, ಯI must sort out what is worrying meರ (Davey, 
Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Patterson, 2005). These rules donಬt necessarily tell the 
worrier how to achieve the goal, but they have a motivational influence by stressing 
the importance of the goal and activating processes for monitoring whether the goal 
has been achieved (Davey, 2006b). With repeated deployment, these goal-directed 
rules are likely to be activated automatically and evaluated implicitly (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1989), resulting in a motivational impact that will have an 
influence on task perseveration that appears to be outside of the worrierಬs ability to 
deliberately control. 
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 First, there is good evidence that worriers have biases in beliefs about the 
worry process that may influence the deployment and strictness of goal-directed rules 
for worrying. For example, pathological worriers and individuals with a diagnosis of 
GAD hold strong beliefs that worrying is a necessary process that must be undertaken 
fully and properly in order to avoid future catastrophes. For instance, Davey, Tallis & 
Capuzzo (1996) found that beliefs about worrying could be divided into both negative 
and positive beliefs about the consequences of worrying, with negative beliefs 
covering topics such as ಫworry causes me stressಬ and ಫworry exaggerates the problemಬ, 
while positive beliefs include ‘worry motivates me’ and ‘worry helps analytic 
thinking’. Perhaps surprisingly, individuals who scored high on positive beliefs about 
worrying also scored high on a number of measures of psychopathology, including 
trait anxiety and measures of the frequency of pathological worrying, suggesting there 
is a strong association with these positive beliefs about worrying and the tendency to 
worry and to develop other symptoms of anxious psychopathology. Similarly, 
Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens & Diaz (1999) found that individuals with a diagnosis of 
GAD held a number of beliefs about the utility of worrying, including (1) worrying 
will prevent something bad happening, (2) worrying makes it less likely something 
bad will happen, (3) worrying helps me to distract myself from even worse things, (4) 
if I worry about something bad happening then I’ll be prepared for it, and (5) worry is 
an effective way to problem-solve. In addition to these biases in global beliefs about 
worrying, worriers also score highly on other cognitive factors that would indicate a 
need to deploy and monitor strict goal-directed rules for worrying. For example, they 
possess elevated evidence requirements for decision-making (Tallis, Eysenck & 
Mathews, 1991) that would indicate that they should explore all possibilities before 
terminating a worry bout. Trait worry has also been related to measures of 
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perfectionism (Pratt, Tallis & Eysenck, 1997; Frost, Lahart & Rosenblate, 1990), 
feelings of responsibility for negative outcomes (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998), 
intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas, Freeston & Ladouceaur, 1997; Meeten, Dash, 
Scarlet & Davey, 2012), and inflated concerns over mistakes (Stober & Joorman, 
2001). All of these are dispositional factors that are likely to lead to the deployment of 
strict goal-directed rules at the outset of a worry bout, and are likely to generate 
perseveration at the task to ensure that the rather strict outcomes required of worrying 
are achieved (e.g. avoiding bad things happening, reducing uncertainty, minimizing 
mistakes, reducing feelings of responsibility for negative outcomes). 
 In addition, there is now considerable experimental evidence that such 
dispositional traits and biased beliefs about the utility of worry do influence the 
deployment of goal-directed stop rules for worry and facilitate perseveration of the 
worry bout. First, goal-directed rules (often called ‘as many as can’ stop rules in the 
worry literature) can be contrasted with what are known as ‘feel like continuing’ stop 
rules (Martin, Ward, Achee & Wyer, 1993; Davey, 2006b), and pathological worriers 
have a strong bias towards deploying the former rather than the latter type of rule. 
Goal-directed rules require attention to the goal of the worry task and a desire to 
continue with the task until the strict aims of the task have been achieved. In contrast, 
‘feel like continuing’ stop rules require the individual to continue the task only to the 
point where they ‘no longer feel like continuing it’ because, for example, they have 
lost motivation or the task is no longer enjoyable. As we might expect, the 
deployment of goal-directed stop rules is highly correlated with a variety of worry-
relevant variables, including measures of trait worry (the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire, PSWQ), beliefs about the positive consequences of worry (as 
measured by the Consequences of Worry Scale, COWS, Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 
20 
1996), and with measures of shame and guilt (Davey, Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & 
Patterson, 2005, Study 1), and the reported use of goal-directed rules significantly 
predicts perseveration on behavioural measures of catastrophic worrying (Davey, 
Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Patterson, 2005, Study 2). Much of the current 
evidence of a link between positive beliefs about worry and the deployment of goal-
directed rules for worrying is correlational in nature, so we must be wary at this time 
about assuming a causal relationship between beliefs and goal-directed rules. 
However, studies that have experimentally manipulated some of the beliefs relevant 
to worriers, such as intolerance of uncertainty and responsibility for negative 
outcomes, have demonstrated that experimentally inducing these beliefs leads to 
increased perseveration on behavioural measures of worrying such as the 
catastrophizing interview task (Startup & Davey, 2003; Meeten, Dash, Scarlet & 
Davey, 2012). 
 Secondly, explicitly manipulating the deployed stop rule for worrying also has 
important and predicted effects on worry perseveration. For example, Startup & 
Davey (2001) compared worriers and nonworriers on a catastrophizing task when 
they were explicitly asked to use either a goal-directed rule or a ‘feel like continuing’ 
rule. They found that manipulating the deployed rule had differential effects on 
worriers and nonworriers. When participants were asked to use a goal-directed rule, 
worriers generated significantly more catastrophizing steps than nonworriers. 
However, when participants were asked to use a ‘feel like continuing’ rule, worriers 
emitted slightly fewer steps than nonworriers. These are relatively important findings 
because they imply that worriers do not have an iterative style on worry tasks that is 
independent of the task rule that they deploy, with the further implication that 
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perseveration is significantly influenced by the nature and deployment of the rule 
used. 
 
The Role of Mood: We have already mentioned that pathological worriers tend to 
be in significantly more negative moods than nonworriers (e.g. Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger & Borkovec, 1990; Davey, Hampton, Farrell & Davidson, 1992), and this is 
not simply an emotional outcome of the worry process or an affective consequence of 
the need to deal with potential threats. The worrier’s negative mood also exerts a 
significant causal effect on the worry process, creating biases not only in attentional 
and interpretation processes (see earlier sections), but also providing biased 
information by which progress during the worry bout is evaluated. Laboratory studies 
manipulating mood have consistently demonstrated that negative mood (in the form 
of both anxiety and sadness) can significantly prolong the length of a worry bout 
(Johnston & Davey, 1997; Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003), but that this effect cannot 
simply be explained in terms of a mood congruency process. 
 However, negative mood does appear to bias the worry bout towards 
perseveration in two important ways. First, negative mood promotes a more 
systematic, deliberate and effortful information-processing style than positive or 
neutral mood (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Tiedens & Linton, 
2001), and induces comparatively higher performance standards than positive or 
neutral moods (Scott & Cervone, 2002). For example, within the Heuristic-Systematic 
model of information processing, systematic processing is described as an “analytical 
orientation in which perceivers access and scrutinize all informational input for its 
relevance and importance … and integrate all useful information in forming their 
judgments” (Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989, p212), and this effect of negative 
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mood on information processing style implies a bias towards the deployment of 
stricter goal-directed rules for worrying that will facilitate perseveration (e.g. Dash, 
Meeten & Davey, 2013). There is empirical evidence that this is the case. For 
example, Dash & Davey (2012) found that experimentally-induced negative mood 
facilitated the endorsement of cognitive appraisals known to increase systematic 
processing, and also facilitated the endorsement of the deployment of goal-directed 
rules for worrying. A mediation analysis also confirmed that the relationship between 
negative mood and measures of worrying were mediated by the intention to use goal-
directed rules for worry and cognitive appraisals that would generate effortful 
systematic processing during worry. 
 Secondly, negative mood not only biases information processing style during 
worry towards systematic processing that raises performance standards, requires 
effortful scrutiny of all relevant evidence, and the deployment of strict goal-directed 
rules for closure, but also provides information when the worrier is implicitly 
evaluating goal attainment during the worry bout. The use of mood as information in 
these types of context is described by the mood-as-input hypothesis, an approach to 
task perseveration that explains perseveration in terms of an interaction between the 
nature of the deployed rules for the task and the valency of the individual’s concurrent 
mood (Martin, Ward, Achee & Wyer, 1993; Davey, 2006b; Meeten & Davey, 2011). 
For example, if a worrier deploys a goal-directed rule when worrying, they may use 
their current mood during the worry bout to provide information about whether 
they’ve achieved those goals (e.g. solving the problem, repairing negative mood, etc.). 
If they are in a negative mood, this will provide information that the goals have not 
been achieved and so they must continue. In such circumstances, the deployment of 
strict goal-directed rules employing a systematic information processing style with 
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raised performance standards together with a negative mood would be a toxic recipe 
for perseveration. Evidence that individuals do use their current mood as information 
for evaluating progress on open-ended perseverative tasks such as worrying comes 
from studies that have manipulated both mood and the nature of deployed stop rules. 
For instance, compared with a positive mood, negative mood is only associated with 
perseveration when a goal-directed stop rule is used. In contrast, when a ‘feel like 
continuing’ stop rule is used, individuals in a positive mood persevere at the task for 
longer than those in a negative mood (Martin, Ward, Achee & Wyer, 1993; Startup & 
Davey, 2001, 2003; MacDonald & Davey, 2005; Hawksley & Davey, 2010; Meeten 
& Davey, 2012). From this it can be inferred that mood is being used to evaluate the 
aims of the deployed rule. When the rule is to achieve a specific goal using the task, a 
negative mood tells the individual that the goal has not yet been reached and they 
should continue with the task. When the rule is to continue until the individual ‘no 
longer feels like continuing’, a negative mood instead tells them to stop. 
Finally, why should a worrier use their mood to evaluate goal-attainment 
during a worry bout? Why not deploy a more skill-based process based on an 
evaluation using relevant knowledge and experience? The literature on the use of 
mood as information provides some interesting insights into the conditions under 
which individuals will use mood as information, and these conditions have significant 
implications for clinical populations of the kind who suffer from perseverative 
disorders such as pathological worrying (see Meeten & Davey, 2011, p1266-1269). 
For example, individuals will default to using their mood as information (1) when 
they lack the relevant skills and expertise on which to make relevant judgments 
(Schwarz, 2001; Forgas & Tehani, 2005), (2) when they have reason to believe that 
their current mood state is highly relevant to the task at hand (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
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Clark & Isen, 1982), and (3) when cognitive load is high or the task at hand is a 
complex one (Schwarz, Strack, Kommer & Wagner, 1987; Siemer & Reisenzein, 
1998). Pathological worriers who have symptoms severe enough to warrant a clinical 
diagnosis do exhibit these types of characteristics that will facilitate the use of mood 
as information during a worry task. Chronic worriers (1) tend to have significantly 
poorer problem-solving confidence than nonworriers, suggesting a lack of confidence 
in their expertise and ability to successfully solve problems of the type addressed by 
worrying (Davey, 1994; Laugesen & Dugas, 2000; Davey & Levy, 1998), (2) they 
tend to initiate worrying in an attempt to explain, understand and repair their negative 
mood, and so will view their mood as being highly relevant to the worry task (Davey 
& Meeten, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and (3) they tend to adopt information 
processing strategies that inflict a high cognitive load, such as systematic information 
processing (Dash & Davey, 2012), or which deplete working memory capacity 
(Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2008; Leigh & Hirsch, 2011). All of these characteristics 
will tend the worrier to using mood as information when implicitly evaluating goal-
attainment during the worry task. 
 In summary, negative mood has a number of independent causal effects that 
will facilitate perseveration of the worry bout. These effects include the promotion of 
a systematic, deliberate and effortful information-processing style, and the 
deployment of strict goal-directed rules for worrying that will set comparatively 
higher performance standards. In addition, negative mood can also provide 
information that the goals of the worry task have not been achieved and so worry 
should continue. 
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Interactions between Cognitive, Affective & Attentional Factors 
 
 
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the processes that contribute 
to the perseveration of a worry bout based on the empirical evidence discussed above.  
The hatched boxes indicate how attentional and interpretational biases can 
facilitate the identification of potential worries by directly influencing how stimuli 
and events are evaluated or by increasing the frequency with which intrusive negative 
thoughts are experienced (e.g. Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). Such preferential allocation 
of attention to threatening stimuli in anxious individuals is automatic and occurs pre-
attentively (Mogg, Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993; Mogg, Bradley & Halliwell, 
1994), and this preferential allocation of attention has been shown to have a 
ಫdownstreamಬ effect leading to ambiguous information being interpreted in a threat-
related manner that is likely to be automatic (White et al. 2011). As a result, 
interpretation of ambiguous material as threats occurs on-line rather than being 
reconstructed later (Calvo & Castillo, 2001; MacLeod, 1999). Once identified in this 
way, potential worries or threats can activate the worrierಬs positive beliefs about the 
need to worry (Wells, 2007, 2010), and be operationalized in the deployment of goal-
direct rules for worrying, ensuring that the pathological worrier “continues to worry 
until he/she assesses that he/she will be able to effectively cope with anticipated 
threat” (Wells, 2007, p19). Once identified, threats act to prime well-rehearsed and 
habitual goal-directed worry rules in an automatic fashion (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 
2000; Bargh, 1989), and these strict rules for completion of the worry bout will 
themselves directly contribute to perseveration (in order to ensure all eventualities are 
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considered). The fact that an anxious individual may be unable to control attentional 
biases has further implications for the worry bout. This will lead to the worrier 
continually identifying new threats associated with the worry topic in the ಯWhat 
if…?ರ fashion that is typical of pathological worriers (Kendall & Ingram, 1987). Each  
newly identified threat will sustain activation of the cognitive processing strategies 
and goal-directed responses that will contribute to perseveration. An additional 
indirect effect of automatic attentional bias is that it will continually engage working 
memory with newly identified potential threats, and working memory is an important 
contributor to emotion regulation (Hofman, Gschwender, Friese, Wiers & Schmitt, 
2008; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross & Gabrieli, 2002). This is likely to impede any attempts 
at top down inhibitory control, and may even exacerbate the attentional bias because 
loading working memory can create difficulties in disengaging attention (e.g. Judah, 
Grant, Lechner & Mills, 2013; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2008). In these 
respects, the perceptual and interpretational biases operate to facilitate worry in a way 
very similar to those proposed in the cognitive model of Hirsch & Mathews (2012). 
Involuntary allocation of attention to potential threats generates awareness of the 
initial worry, and also generates a stream of subsequent automatic thoughts about 
related threats which give rise to the ಯwhat if …?ರ style of worrisome thinking found 
in pathological worriers. In addition, an inability to exert top down control over these 
perceptual and interpretational biases may result either from the impairing effect that 
worry has on the central executive function of working memory (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos & Calvo, 2007), or the beliefs that worriers develop that worry is inherently 
ಫuncontrollableಬ (Wells, 2010). 
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 The present review extends the information-processing approach 
hypothesized by Hirsch & Mathews (2012) by specifying some of the behavioural and 
cognitive processes downstream from attentional and interpretational bias that add to 
the perseverative nature of worry in pathological worriers. These include the 
activation of beliefs about both the utility and uncontrollability of worry (Wells, 
2010), the automatic deployment of strict goal-directed responses for dealing with the 
threat, the role of negative mood in facilitating effortful forms of information 
processing (i.e. systematic information processing styles), and in providing negative 
information for evaluating the success of the worry bout. In earlier sections of this 
paper we have already provided evidence supporting many of the interactions 
illustrated in Figure 1, including the effect of attentional biases on threat interpretation 
(e.g. White et al., 2011), the effect of a threat interpretation bias on negative mood 
(e.g. Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews & Rutherford, 2006), the effect of negative mood 
on systematic information processing (e.g. Ambady & Gray, 2002), and the effect of 
negative mood on the deployment of goal-directed rules for worry (e.g. Dash & 
Davey, 2012), the use of negative mood as evaluative information (e.g. Startup & 
Davey, 2001), and the effect of the deployment of goal-directed rules for worry on 
worry perseveration (e.g. Davey, Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Patterson, 2005). 
Interactions that still require some endorsing evidence include the influence that threat 
perception has in triggering goal-directed rules for worry and positive beliefs about 
worry. However, evidence for the automatic activation of goal-directed behaviours 
and beliefs by worries could be investigated using the goal-priming paradigm 
described by Aarts & Dijksterhuis (2000) in which we would predict that response 
latencies to goal-directed rules for worry and positive worry beliefs would be faster 
following priming by worry words than non-worry words. Finally, while there is good 
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evidence for a causal effect of negative mood in facilitating systematic information 
processing, there is less direct evidence that systematic information processing 
directly contributes to perseverative worry. However, systematic information 
processing appears to be supported by a functionally distinct brain process located in 
the left frontal lobes (Leynes, 2002; Leynes & Phillips, 2008), and studies have 
reported that increases in worrying are also associated with increased left hemisphere 
frontal activation (Borkovec, Ray & Stober, 1998). This suggests that both systematic 
processing and worrying are verbal-based forms of analytical thought supported by 
functionally similar brain processes. Studies directly manipulating styles of 
information processing and observing the effect of this on worry perseveration have 
still to be performed, although there is very substantial evidence to expect these 
effects to be found when such studies are conducted (e.g. Dash, Meeten & Davey, 
2013). 
The role of negative mood is critical because it has a number of separate 
causal effects. It facilitates the deployment of goal-directed rules for the worry bout 
and initiates the deliberate and effortful process of systematic information processing 
(Dash & Davey, 2012). In addition it also provides negative information that is used 
during the evaluation of goal attainment - a process that inferential experimental 
studies indicate will facilitate perseveration if the worrier has deployed goal-directed 
rules for the bout (Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003). This multiple role of negative mood 
in generating worry perseveration may also have some added benefits that reinforce 
the tendency to worry over successive bouts. For example, the contrast avoidance 
model of worry proposes that worry is reinforced because pathological worriers prefer 
to feel chronically distressed in order to prepare for the worst outcome associated with 
the threat, and there is a significant amount of physiological evidence to support this 
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view (Newman & Llera, 2011). Thus, any proximal processes that prolong the worry 
bout will have the added advantage of avoiding a negative emotional contrast (i.e. a 
shift from a positive state to a negative emotion), and also maintain the worrier in a 
state that helps them to anticipate and prepare for the negative event (Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995). As Newman & Lera (2011) suggest, this will increase the likelihood 
that those processes generating worry perseveration will be activated on future 
occasions. 
One important clinical feature of the perseverative worry bout in pathological 
worriers is that this process causes the worrier increasing distress as the worry bout 
continues (Davey, Eldridge, Drost & MacDonald, 2007; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). 
This distress is typical of worriers with a diagnosis of GAD, and is something that 
still requires explanation as a defining feature of pathological worrying. There are two 
sources of distress that are consequences of the perseverative nature of worry 
described here. One is the role that beliefs about worrying may play in generating 
worry-related distress. A perplexing feature of pathological worriers is that they 
appear to hold what seem like contradictory beliefs about worry: positive beliefs that 
worry is necessary (e.g. “worry will keep me safe”), as well as negative beliefs that 
worry is uncontrollable and dangerous (e.g. “worrying will make me lose my mind”) 
(Wells, 2010; Davey, Tallis & Cappuzo, 1996), and holding both types of beliefs is 
associated with significantly higher scores on a variety of psychopathology measures 
than holding just negative beliefs (Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996). One plausible 
hypothesis is that these negative beliefs about worry are a consequence of the 
processes that contribute to the perseverative mechanism that underlies pathological 
worry. These include the contribution of perceptual and interpretation biases that 
occur pre-attentively (e.g. Mogg, Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993; Mogg, 
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Bradley & Halliwell, 1994), the deployment of goal-oriented task rules that are likely 
to be nonverbal in nature and automatically activated when used habitually (Davey, 
2006b; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000), and the implicit involvement of, or misattribution 
of, mood in evaluating outcomes (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Oikawa, Aarts & Oikawa, 
2011). This automaticity will inevitably result in poor awareness of these interactive 
factors (preventing insight into the reasons why worry becomes perseverative) and to 
all intents and purposes makes worry seem uncontrollable. This hypothesis is 
supported by the fact that individuals meeting diagnostic criteria for GAD score 
significantly higher than non-worriers on beliefs that worry is uncontrollable and 
dangerous (Davis & Valentier, 2000), and although more research is required, it is 
feasible that these beliefs about the uncontrollability and dangerousness of worry 
contribute to the distress experienced during a perseverative worry bout.  
A second source of potential distress for pathological worriers is the research 
finding that as a worry bout continues, more self-statements about personal 
inadequacy and inability to cope intrude into the worry stream of pathological 
worriers regardless of the actual worry topic itself (Davey & Levy, 1998, Study 6), 
and these types of statement are significantly correlated with measures of anxiety, 
depression and poor problem-solving confidence (Davey & Levy, 1999). These 
statements certainly seem to be associated with increasing levels of distress – but only 
in individuals scoring high on measures of pathological worry (Vasey & Borkovec, 
1992; Davey, Eldridge, Drost & MacDonald, 2007), so they may represent the effects 
during a worry bout of dispositional factors possessed by worriers (such as poor 
problem-solving confidence) rather than being an effect of perseveration per se. The 
effect of these increasing levels of distress as the worry bout continues is to contribute 
further negative mood and to exacerbate the effects that negative mood will have on 
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perseveration. Given that increasing negative mood will increase perseveration, how 
does the pathological worrier disengage from the worry process? One way in which 
disengagement can eventually occur is through the abandonment of ಫas many as canಬ 
goal-directed responses in favour of ಫfeel like continuingಬ stop rules (Davey, Eldridge, 
Drost & MacDonald, 2007). ಫFeel like continuingಬ stop rules ask the implicit question 
ಫDo I feel like continuing with this task?ಬ, and if the worrier is using their mood as 
information, their high levels of negative mood will indicate they do not feel like 
continuing. In this way, changes in stop rule during the worry bout can have quite 
significant effects on whether the individual either stops worrying or continues to 
perseverate. 
Finally, while perseveration appears to be dependent on the cognitive biases 
and individual characteristics that worriers bring with them to the worry bout, further 
etiological research is required to understand why pathological worriers have 
developed positive beliefs about the utility of worrying and how these beliefs are 
operationalized into goal-directed rules for worrying. In addition, the negative mood 
that pathological worriers bring with them to the worry bout is also endemic (Decker, 
Turk, Hess & Murray, 2008; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk & Fresco, 1995), and the 
psychological and biological factors that support this pervasive anxious experience 
still need to be fully catalogued, and the processes that generate this endemic state 
described and evaluated. 
 
 
Clinical Implications 
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Providing a detailed analysis of all the factors that may interact to generate a 
perseverative worry bout has a number of implications for interventions for 
pathological worrying.  
First, the interactive processes that generate perseveration are often implicit 
and occur outside of awareness. One such factor is the interaction between goal-
directed rules for worry and the use of a concurrent negative mood to evaluate 
progress towards that goal. This is known as the “mood-as-input” hypothesis because 
mood is used as input to evaluate progress on the worry task (Startup & Davey, 2001; 
Meeten & Davey, 2011; Davey, 2006b). Using a brief, low-intensity psychoeducation 
procedure, Dash, Meeten, Jones & Davey (2014) provided high worriers with 
psychoeducation about the basic principles of the mood-as-input hypothesis and 
received guidance on how to identify and change worry-relevant goal-directed rules 
for worry and also how to identify and change negative moods. Compared to controls 
who received no information about the mood-as-input hypothesis, psychoeducation 
about the model significantly reduced measures of worry at follow-up, and homework 
tasks raised mood and reduced worry immediately. This suggests that providing basic 
insight into the processes that generate perseveration, helping the individual to 
identify the stop rules they deploy for worrying, and to identify and change negative 
mood can have immediate beneficial effects. In addition, a further implication of 
providing insights into the role of negative mood during worrying is that a range of 
mood management interventions can be adopted to help the worrier manage their 
worry-related negative moods – moods that contribute directly to perseveration. These 
include behavioural activation interventions developed specifically for excessive 
worry (e.g. Chen, Liu, Rapee & Pillay, 2013), and mindfulness and acceptance-based 
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approaches that will help the worrier to distance themselves from on-going negative 
emotions (Orsillo & Roemer, 2011). 
Second, one obvious implication of the processes represented in Figure 1 is 
that the frequency of worrying would be reduced if the threat-relevant attentional and 
interpretation biases that identify potential worries could be reduced. One method for 
achieving this is the use of cognitive bias modification (CBM) procedures (MacLeod 
& Mathews, 2012; Hakamata, Lissek, Bar-Haim, Britton et al., 2010), in which 
pathological worriers would be provided with a structured program of computer-
based trials that would establish attentional and interpretational predispositions 
towards benign resolutions and away from threatening ones.  Prototype CBM 
interventions have already been found to successfully reduce threat attentional biases 
(Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2010), and threat interpretational biases (Hirsch, Hayes & 
Mathews, 2009) in high worriers. However, there is still some doubt about the longer-
term effectiveness of CBM procedures, and whether such procedures have any 
significant effect on clinical symptoms (Koster & Bernstein, 2015; Cristea, Kok & 
Cuijpers, 2015). But despite these concerns, CBM procedures would seem to be a 
useful tool in the early stages of an integrated intervention package for pathological 
worriers. 
Thirdly, dysfunctional beliefs about the utility or benefit of worrying may be a 
trigger for the deployment of strict goal-directed rules for the worry episode (e.g. “I 
must continue to worry until I have covered all the possible problems that this worry 
raises”). We know very little about how these positive beliefs about worry develop, 
but they are characteristic of pathological worriers generally (Breitholtz, Westling & 
Ost, 1998; Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996; Wells, 2010; Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens 
& Diaz, 1999), and are a significant factor in motivating the worrier’s desire to worry. 
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In order to address and modify these positive beliefs, Wells and colleagues have 
developed a metacognitive therapy for worry (Wells, 1997, 2007, 2010). This therapy 
involves socializing the client to the metacognitive model and beliefs about worrying, 
and challenging positive beliefs about worrying through a combination of verbal 
reattribution and behavioural experiments (e.g. increasing and decreasing worry 
whilst performing tasks to determine if worrying actually enhances performance or 
improves coping). Outcome studies suggest that this approach is associated with 
greater levels of recovery than approaches comprised of applied relaxation or CBT 
treatment focused on intolerance of uncertainty (Fisher, 2006; Wells, Welford, King, 
Papageorgiou, Wisely & Mendel, 2010; Heiden, Methorst, Muris & Molen, 2012). 
Finally, as we begin to unpack the details of the proximal mechanisms that 
underlie an individual bout of pathological worrying, we begin to have a picture of 
what an integrated, comprehensive intervention for pathological worrying might look 
like. The early stages should begin with socialization to the model and in particular to 
important interactions within the model (e.g. between stop rules and concurrent 
mood). This psychoeducation would enable the client to identify these processes 
during their own worrying, and to manage their negative moods using a range of 
developed methods such as behavioural activation, mindfulness, and acceptance-
based approaches. Dealing with deep-seated beliefs about worry (both positive and 
negative) would seem an obvious second stage – probably using metacognitive 
therapy principles to challenge these beliefs. A final stage would involve providing 
the client with a toolbox for dealing with real time worry bouts by helping them to 
identify and change negative moods and dysfunctional goal-directed stop rules. 
Alleviating negative mood would have a number of benefits by (1) reducing the desire 
to deploy goal-directed rules for worry, (2) reducing the tendency to utilize systematic 
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information processing strategies that are likely to lead to micro-analysis of problems 
and to the generation of “what if …?” questioning styles, and (3) eliminating the use 
of negative mood as information which would have prevented closure on the worry 
episode. Finally, CBM could be offered for threat-related attention and interpretation 
biases if such biases are found to be a particularly strong feature of an individual’s 
worry processes. While an integrated approach of this kind to treating pathological 
worry is yet to be tested, it is worth reiterating that most of the elements in this 
integrated approach have already been shown to have beneficial effects on levels of 
pathological worrying, including a psychoeducation intervention addressing the role 
of mood-as-input (Dash, Meeten, Jones & Davey, 2014), metacognitive therapy 
addressing dysfunctional beliefs about worry (Wells, 2010), and CBM procedures 
addressing attentional and interpretational biases (Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2010; 
Hirsch, Hayes & Mathews, 2009). 
 
Summary 
 
This paper has reviewed some of the cognitive, affective and attentional factors that 
contribute to the perseverative worry bout typical of pathological worriers. We 
describe how automatic biases in attentional and interpretational processes contribute 
to threat detection and to the inclusion of negative intrusive thoughts into the worry 
stream typical of the ಯwhat if …?ರ thinking style of pathological worriers. We also 
describe processes occurring downstream from these perceptual biases that facilitate 
perseveration, including the activation of beliefs about the utility of worry, the 
automatic deployment of strict goal-directed responses for dealing with the threat, the 
role of negative mood in facilitating effortful forms of information processing (i.e. 
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systematic information processing styles), and in providing negative information for 
evaluating the success of the worry bout. The clinical implications of these factors for 
an integrated intervention programme for pathological worrying are also considered. 
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FIGURE LEGEND 
 
A schematic representation of the processes that contribute to perseveration of an 
individual worry bout. This represents an integrated cascading network of cognitive 
and behavioural reactions in response to the threat posed by the worry (see text for 
further elaboration).  
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